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Kennedy: Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Congressional Response

REFORMING THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE:
A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
EDWARD

M.

KENNEDY*

Effective crime control means something more than gun control,
reform of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and
streamlining the administration of criminal justice. The federal government can set an example for the states in the area of criminal code
reform. A major task awaits us-the first comprehensive revision of
the Federal Criminal Code. Critical issues like capital punishment,
sentencing, wiretapping, the insanity defense and the role of the press
in national security cases must be resolved by Congress in the coming
months. But the work we are undertaking must truly be worthy of the
label 'real reform.'
SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
October 20, 1975
Chicago, Illinois
I.

INTRODUCTION

The subject of crime remains a chief concern of Americans today.' Our
nation's soaring crime rate and the inability of our criminal justice system to
dispense swift and sure justice have given rise to various legislative proposals
designed to combat the growth of crime. Although the war on crime is
primarily a state and local problem, Congress has provided valuable financial
and technical assistance to aid localities in their struggle. 2 But just as
important as any federal financial commitment to improve state and local law
enforcement efforts are legislative models, at the federal level, which can
serve as examples to be copied by state legislatures in improving their own
criminal justice systems.
The most comprehensive and innovative effort undertaken by the Congress
to deal with the nation's crime problem is now underway-the drafting of a
* Senior Senator from Massachusetts. A.B. 1956, Harvard College; International Law
School, The Hague, 1958; LL.B., 1959; University of Virginia.
1. See, e.g., FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1976); Hearings, Nat '1
Comm 'non the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1969); REPORT OF U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY
COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDER (1968); NATL COMM'N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF
VIOLENcE, To INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY XIV(1967); Ennis, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT OF A NATL SURVEY (Nat '7 Opinion Res. Center, May, 1976);
Howard, Police Reports and Victimization Survey Results: An Empirical Study, 12 CRIMINOLOGY
133 (1975); Lesley, Building New Support for Enforcing the Law, Public Attitudes on Crime and
Law Enforcement, 42 VITAL SPEECHES 524 (1976); Public Opinion on Criminal Law and Legal
Sanctions: An Examination of two Conceptual Models, 67 J. CRIM. L. 110 (1976); Bartel,
Analysis of Firm Demand for Protection Against Crime, 4 J. LEGAL STUDIES 443 (1975).
2. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, P.L. 90-351, as amended
in 1970, (P.L. 91-644), 1973 (P.L. 93-83) and, most recently, in 1976 (P.L. 94-503). See also, the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, P.L. 93-415.
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completely new federal criminal code. Criminal code reform is not a hastily
conceived idea. Efforts to update existing state criminal codes can be traced
back to the 1950's, when the American Law Institute first developed its
MODEL PENAL CODE. 3 The main impetus for current congressional efforts was
the establishment, in 1966, of the National Commission on Reform of
Criminal Laws. 4 The Commission's mandate included:
. .a full and complete review and study of the statutory and case law
of the United States which constitutes the federal system of criminal
justice for the purpose of formulating and recommending to the
Congress legislation which would improve the federal system of
criminal justice. It shall be the further duty of the Commission to
make recommendations for revision and recodification of the criminal laws of the United States, including the repeal of unnecessary or
undesirable statutes and such changes in the penalty structure
5 as the
Commission may feel will better serve the ends of justice.
*

In 1971, this national commission, chaired by former Governor Edmund
G. Brown of California, issued its final report in the form of a substantive
code similar to the MODEL PENAL CODE. 6 The Brown Commissionconcluded
that a complete new codification of the federal criminal code was necessary
and called on Congress to undertake the task using its Final Report as a
starting point.
II.

PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Extensive hearings on the Final Report spanned the 92d Congress, from
1971 to 1973. 7 In 1973, during the first session of the 93rd Congress, two
versions of a criminal code reform bill were introduced in the Senate as a basis
for further hearings-Senate Bill 1 and Senate Bill 1400 (hereinafter referred
to as S. 1 and S. 1400). These bills generally reflected views gleaned from the
Brown Commission, the hearings in the 92d Congress, the Department of
Justice and other federal agencies,s and comments from numerous professional and public interest sources.
3. MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953). See also H. Wechsler, The Challenge ofa
Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1097 (1952). Although the United States has never enacted a
comprehensive criminal code, several consolidations and revisions-largely limited to eliminating gross inconsistencies-have occurred. See, e.g., Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 350, § 321,
35 Stat. 1088; Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 772, § 645, 62 Stat. 683.
4. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-801. § 3, 80 Stat. 1516.
5. Id. at 1516-17.
6.

FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS

(1971) hereinafter referred to as the Brown Commission and Final Report. See also WORKING
PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS (1970).

(hereinafter cited as Working Papers)
7; Hearings on Brown Commission Final Report Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d-93d Cong. (1973). (hereinafter referred
to as Hearings)
8. See, e.g., testimony of Herbert Wechsler, chief reporter for the MODEL PENAL CODE.
Hearings at 522.
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On January 15, 1975, S.l of the 94th Congress, titled "The Criminal
Justice Reform Act of 1975," was introduced in the Senate by Senators John
L. McClellan and Roman L. Hruska, along with other numerous cosponsors.
Based on a hearing record of some 8000 pages, this new version of S. 1 was a
blend of the previous bills and accompanying hearings. Following two days
of further hearings and after weeks of study and negotiation, the Senate
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures 9 unanimously reported the
bill to the full Senate Judiciary Committee.' 0 (hereinafter referred to as the
Committee).
The ongoing efforts of negotiation and compromise continued in the
Committee" with the encouragement of the leadership-Senators Mike
Mansfield and Hugh Scott. Senators Philip A. Hart, James Abourezk, and I
sought to identify and work out with Senators McClellan and Hruska those
areas of controversy in the bill that imperiled the legislation.' 2 Although
essential compromises were not completely worked out in time to enable
action in the 94th Congress, these discussions and formal delineations of
position form a sound basis for processing a new criminal code bill next
session.
III. THE NEED FOR REVISION
Why has all of this effort been expended to achieve a replacement for Title
18 of the United States Code? The fact is that the current code is in desperate
need of revision. (I deliberately avoid characterizing the effort as a "recodifi9. The Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures consisted of: John L. McClellan,
Chairman, Arkansas, Philip A. Hart, Michigan, James 0. Eastland, Mississippi, Edward M.
Kennedy, Massachusetts, Robert C. Byrd, West Vriginia, Roman Hruska, Nebraska, Hugh
Scott, Pennsylvania, and Strom Thurmond, South Carolina.
10. Not all of the members of the Subcommitteeapproved of the bill in agreeing to report it to
the full Senate Judiciary Committee. In a letter to the Subcommittee Chairman, dated September
17, 1975, both Senator Philip A. Hart and I reserved our rights to amend the bill further, but
agreed to report it to the full committee "without recommendation" where further debate could
occur on an orderly basis.
ii.
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
James 0. Eastland, Mississippi, Chairman
John L. McClellan, Arkansas
Roman L. Hruska, Nebraska
Philip A. Hart, Michigan
Hiram L. Fong, Hawaii
Edward M. Kennedy. Massachusetts
Hugh Scott, Pennsylvania
Birch Bayh, Indiana
Strom Thurmond, South Carolina
Quentin N. Burdick, North Dakota
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Maryland
Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia
William L. Scott, Virginia
John V. Tunney, California
James Abourezk, South Dakota
12. In a memorandum of February 9, 1976, Senators Mansfield and Scott suggested that, in
an effort to come up with an acceptable bill, the principal Senators involved in the S. I discussions
draft a new bill without those highly controversial sections, such as insanity, entrapment, the
"Official Secrets Act", and capital punishment, which imperiled passage. In a memorandum of
March 8, 1976, Senators Hart, Abourezk and I proposed certain changes as a first step toward
reaching such an agreement. Senators McClellan and Hruska made a very constructive response
to this memorandum on March 25, 1976. Negotiations have since continued, at the staff level, in
an effort to iron out all remaining issues.
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cation" since no systematic codification of federal criminal law has ever
occurred!) Laced with ambiguities, historical anomalies, and inconsistencies,
our current federal criminal laws are a disgrace. I3 Title 18 is merely a random
assembly of provisions arranged without consideration of the content of other
chapters.' 4 Further, other important offenses are scattered throughout the
other fifty titles of the United States Code.1 5 Critics and proponents of S. 1
alike are unanimous in the view that the first step in waging an effective war
on crime-a step that many states have already taken in enacting modernized
penal codes16-is the prompt development of a comprehensive, logically
organized, and internally consistent federal criminal law.
A few concrete examples demonstrate the depth of the problems found in
Title 18. Federal sentencing practices are hopelessly inconsistent and lead to
unjustified disparity-two offenders who have committed identical offenses
may find themselves in adjoining federal prison cells serving widely disparate
sentences, while a third like offender walks the street, a beneficiary of
probation._Sections dealing with the commitment of the mentally ill offender17 seem more in tune with the philosophy of the Middle Ages. The federal
laws governing rape and other sex offenses are hopelessly outdated. '8 Some
seventy often conflicting sections deal with theft, 19 while over eighty separate
provisions relate to forgery and counterfeiting. 20 The federal mail fraud
statute suffers from a maze of inconsistencies-an offender who, in perpetrating a vast multistate fraud sends one letter through the mail is liable for a
maximum penalty of five years; while another petty swindler whose fraud is
minor but who, in the course of committing the fraud mails three letters, is
subject to a maximum of fifteen years! In Nelson v. United States, 178 F.2d
458 (9th Cir. 1949), the court held that mailing several letters to different
addresses in pursuance of a single scheme to defraud did in fact constitute
separate offenses of using the mails to promote fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§341, and stated that separate sentences could be imposed for each violation.
See also Durand v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
13. Brown Commission at xii-xiii.
14. See, e.g., Brown Commission §§ 201, 1721, 302.
15. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §2027 (1970) (food stamps); 15 U.S.C. §80 b-3 (1970) (registration of
investment advisors); 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1970) (over-the-counter markers); 42 U.S.C. § 261 (1970)
(penalties for introducing prohibited articles and substances into hospitals). See Generally Brown
Commission § 3006.
16. See, e.g., HAWAII PENAL CODE tit. 37; N.C. GEN. STAT. Ch. 5 (1975 replacement); N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 100 et. seq. (McKenney 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 16 (1975).
17. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246-4248 (1970).
18. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1970).
19. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 641-664 (1970) (theft); 18 U.S.C. § 2111-2117 (1970) (robbery and
burglary); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1734 (1970) (postal service theft); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1343 (1970) (mail
fraud); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2076 (1970) (theft of records and reports); 18 U.S.C. §2197 (1970) (theft
by seamen and stowaways); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2318 (1970) (stolen property).
20. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 471-509 (1970) (counterfeiting and forgery); 18 U.S.C. §§
1543-1546 (1970) (passports and visas); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314, 2315, 2318 (1970) (stolen property); 18
U.S.C. § 1002, 1003, 1008, 1010 (1970) (fraud and false statements); 18 U.S.C. § 3185 (1970)
(extradition of counterfeiter); 18 U.S.C. § 2156 (1970) (counterfeiting national defense
documents).
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Outdated provisions make it illegal to lie to a ship's captain, 2 1 prohibit a
seaman from seducing a female passenger on an American vessel 22 and make
it a crime for anyone to prevent a United States government carrier pigeon
from completing its appointed rounds. 23

IV.

THE NEED To REORGANIZE TITLE 18

Most critics of the current law agree that any new criminal code must
reorganize Title 18 in a logical and consistent manner. 24 All general legal
principles (for example, culpability requirements and defenses), specific
offenses, and sentencing provisions should be clearly delineated by separate
headings. Encompassed under such headings should be further chapters,
subchapters and sections. The goal must be a logical progression in the
development of the federal criminal law.
A.

General Legal Principles
The general legal principles section would deal with such subjects as
criminal culpability. A new criminal code must standardize the various levels of
culpability required for commission of various offenses. The requisite state of
mind is not comprehensively and precisely defined in current federal statutes.
The task of construing the "mental elements" used in a particular statute has
been left to the courts. The result has been confusion, conflict and disparate
application. As noted in the report of the Committee,25 the federal criminal
justice system is in a state of chaos:
For example, the term 'willful' has been construed by the courts in a
variety of ways, often inconsistent and contradictory. The courts
have defined a 'willful' act as an act done voluntarily as distinguished
from accidentally, an act done with specific intent to violate the law,
an act done with bad purpose, an act done without justifiable excuse,
an act done stubbornly, an act done without grounds for believing it is
lawful, and an act done
with careless disregard whether or not one has
26
the right so to act.
The present code contains over fifty undefined terms relating to the state of
mind accompanying various crimes. 27 The MODEL PENAL CODE lists but four
21. 18 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2198 (1970).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
24. See, e.g., Phillips, The Proposed Federal Justice Reform Act of 1975: A Civil Liberties
Critique, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 591 (1975); Clark, Prologue to Symposium of Proposed Federal
Criminal Codes, 68 N.W.U.L. REV. 817 (1973); Dobbyn, Proposal for Changing the Jurisdic-

tional Provisions of the New Federal Criminal Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 33 (1972); Schwartz,
The Proposed Federal Criminal Codes, 13 CRIM. L. REP. 3265 (1973); Wechsler, Codification of
Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425 (1968).
25.

S. REP. No. 94-00, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1976).

26. Id. at 51-52. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Spies v. United
States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
27. See, for example, the use of the word "knowingly" in the following sections: 18 U.S.C. §
1082 (1970) (gambling); 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1970) (bankruptcy); the use of "unlawfully" in the
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for all crimes-intentional, knowing, reckless and negligent. 2 8
B.

Offenses
We must also modernize the definitions and gradings of existing offenses.
For example, one new omnibus theft offense should replace the approximately seventy interrelated and inconsistent larceny and embezzlement
sections now in current law. 29 And, whereas the penalty now imposed on a
convicted offender depends on the nature of the theft or embezzlement, not on
the seriousness of the crime, such arbitrary distinctions should be eliminated.
(For example, robbery of a federally insured bank currently carries a
maximum term of twenty-five years, 30 while robbery of a United States Post
Office carries a ten year maximum sentence. 31) Similar consolidations of
various multiple provisions should also occur in the areas of property
36
destruction, 32 forgery 33 and counterfeiting,

34

perjury 35 and false statements.

The definitions of murder 37 and manslaughter 38 should be modernized to
reflect current thinking on the issue of culpability, while the39archaic federal
rape and sex offense laws should be completely rewritten.
Added to any new code must be effective-new provisions designed to meet
some of the problems of modern society. We must substantially strengthen
civil rights law enforcement efforts by eliminating the current requirement of
specific intent mandated by Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). No
longer should a defendant who knew that he was violating an individual's
civil rights be able to argue that he did not specifically intend to violate those
rights. New provisions aimed at corporate fraud and Watergate-type election
practices are essential if we are to signal a new commitment by the federal
government in the areas of white collar crime and government corruption. For
example, there are currently conflicting interpretations of the terms "willfully" or "willfully and knowingly", as used in section 5 and section 17 of
the Securities Act of 1933, regarding fraud in the sale of unregistered
securities and fraud in the offer and sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. §§ 5, 17
following sectiQns: 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (1970) (manslaughter); 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970) (murder); the
use of "willfully" in the following sections: 18 U.S.C. § 1163 (1970) (Indians); 18 U.S.C. § 1201
(1970) (kidnapping); the use of "maliciously" in the following sections: 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970)
(murder); 18 U.S.C. § 81 (1970) (arson); the use of "willfully and maliciously" in 18 U.S.C. § 1362
(1970) (malicious mischief).
28. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02 (proposed official draft, 1962).
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 641-664 (1970) (embezzlement and theft).
30.
31.

18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970).
18 U.S.C. § 2115 (1970).

32. 18 U.S.C. § 1363 (1970).
33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 471, 478, 482, 493, 1426 (1970).
34.

18 U.S.C. §§ 471-509 (1970).

35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1622 (1970).
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1027 (1970).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (1970).

39. 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1970).
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(1970). Many courts have indicated that it is not necessary to prove specific
intent to violate the law, only that the defendant intentionally sold or offered
to sell unregistered securities through the mails or interstate commerce. 40 In
nearly all cases, the courts have not required proof of an evil motive or bad
purpose.41 A clear enunciation of the culpable state of mind required for
conviction under these acts would eliminate confusion in this key area.
As to government corruption, the aftermath of Watergate clearly dictates
areas of essential reform. Federal jurisdiction over the break-in of the
Democratic Headquarters was only possible because the Watergate Hotel was
located in the District of Columbia. If the same type of political break-in had
occurred in one of the states, the federal government would not have had
jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction must be extended to cover these types of
corrupt political and governmental actions, if these abuses are to be adequately dealt with on the national level. Further, although 18 U.S.C. § 612
(1970) addresses itself to what are now known as campaign "dirty tricks",
there have been few prosecutions under this section and the scope of the
section is unclear. 42 Clarification in this area is essential to help eliminate
activity so detrimental to our national well-being.
A provision dealing with compensation of victims of crime would assure,
for the first time, that the federal government will provide monetary benefits
to those victims of a federal criminal attack.
But the most important and far-reaching changes occurring in any new
federal criminal code must deal with federal sentencing policy. We must
establish a uniform grading system whereby each serious offense is divided
into various statutory degrees. The most severe penalties should be uniformly
limited to aggravated forms of the offense. For example, the most aggravated
forms of offense could be lettered Class A, with a descending order of
intensity assigned consecutive letters (i. e. murder would be a Class A felony,
manslaughter would be a Class C felony and negligent homicide would be a
Class D felony).
Most importantly, general guidelines to aid judges in the exercise of their
sentencing discretion should be established, along with limited appellate
40. Kistner v. United States, 332 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1964). Contra, (by implication)
United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796,808-810 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1006(1970); United States v. Tarvestad, 418 F.2d 1043, 1047(8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied397
U.S. 935; United States v. Custer Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675,680 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied389
U.S. 850.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Insco, 496 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1974). The prosecution was based
on the printing and distribution of bumper stickers which did not contain the requisite "attribution clause". The court held that since bumper stickers were in existence at the time the Act was
passed, yet Congress did not specifically include them in its recitation of specific items falling
within the ambit of the Act, that Congress did not intend for bumper stickers to be covered by the
Act. The court went on to hold that the phrase "any statement", as used in the Act, could not be
extended to include bumper stickers under the doctrine of ejustem generis and, therefore, the
defendant was inadequately apprised of the wrongfulness of his conduct.
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review of sentences. The goal is to achieve some degree of uniformity in the
sentences imposed in the federal courts. The absence of any articulated
purposes or goals of sentencing has unfortunately resulted in a situation where
different judges often mete out different sentences to similar defendants
convicted of similar crimes depending on the sentencing attitudes of the
particular judge. The resulting sentencing disparity has become a national
scandal. 43 Criminal code reform can change all of this.

V.

S. 1 NOT A SUITABLE VEHICLE FOR REFORM

Despite the obvious need for a new criminal code, I concluded that S. 1, as
originally introduced, was not a suitable vehicle to realize the reforms I have
mentioned. S. 1 carried forward too many unnecessary provisions of existing
law and constituted, in a number of respects, an unwise and unnecessary
encroachment upon civil liberties and lawful political dissent. For example,
the sections in Chapter 11, labeled by critics an "Official Secrets Act" would
have, in my judgement, unnecessarily shackled the press." The provisions
would have had a "chilling effect" on expression that clearly could not have
been enjoined. See New York Times Company v. UnitedStates, 403 U.S. 714
(1971). Such offenses could not be countenanced in light of the recent
revelations of abuses by the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau
of Investigation. Further, such provisions did not require specific intent and,
therefore could have been "a trap for innocent acts". Papachristiouv. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
Section 522 would have unwisely abolished the traditional insanity defense
at the very time the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals appear to be
largely in agreement on a basic insanity test. In UnitedStates v. McGraw, 515
F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first cited its
earlier holding in Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970) (en
banc), in which it held that, as regards the insanity defense, wrongfulness
means moral wrongfulness rather than criminal wrongfulness. In McGraw
the court went on to say that a total of five other circuits have now adopted that
view. As these courts interpret the rule, a defendant lacks substantial capacity
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct if he knows his act to be
criminal but, nevertheless, commits it because of a delusion that it is morally
justified. 515 F.2d at 759-760.
Section 1103 would have retained a repressive symbol of another era-the
43. See M.

FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER

(1972); A.

VONHRISCH,

DOING JUSTICE-THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT: REPORT

OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING (1976); K. Davis,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INOUIRY

(1969); Discretion in felony sentencing-a

Study of Influencing Factors, 48 WASH. L. REV. 857(1973); Harris & Lura, Geography of Justice:

Sentencing Variations in United States Judicial Districts, 57 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 392 (1974);
Clemens, Sex and Sentencing, 26 S.W.L.J. 890 (1972).
44. See National Security and Freedom ofthe Press: the Constitutionality ofS. 1's "National
Defense Information" Provisions, 9 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 323 (1976).
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so-called SMITH ACT. 45 These and many other provisions were, in my
judgment, inconsistent with
code. Although most of S.
improvement over existing
significant amendments, as
VI.

A

the concept of a just, workable, modem criminal
1 could be viewed as a noncontroversial major
law, I viewed its possible enactment, without
a lost opportunity for genuine reform.

MODERN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE

During the past year a major effort has been undertaken in the Senate to
come up with an alternative to S. 1-an alternative that would reflect both the
best features of S. 1 and changes which I and others perceived as essential to
any new federal criminal code. Various Senators, joined by representatives of
the Department of Justice and leading members of the academic community,
have labored tirelessly to work out the many controversial areas and to perfect
an altogether new bill.
At the outset, I consider it essential to genuine reform that codification of
the entire federal criminal law finally be accomplished. Piecemeal codification will not do. But in doing so, the new bill must reject, in their entirety,
those provisions of S. 1 which constitute an impermissible invasion of
constitutional liberties. At the same time, justice demands that certain current
provisions of Title 18 be severely limited or totally excised. Finally, careful
consideration must be given to the enactment of new laws recommended in
both the BROWN COMMISSION REPORT and the MODEL PENAL CODE.
A.

Essential Codification

Although recognizing the need for codification, some have argued that
such a bill would be simply too cumbersome to deal with effectively (for
example, S. 1 was 800 pages long as finally reported by the Subcommittee).
However, length in such an undertaking cannot be avoided if comprehensive
reform is to succeed. Uniformity and consistency in our criminal law cannot
be achieved on a piecemeal basis. Moreover, such a bill need not be
unmanageably long. H.R. 1, the Welfare Reform Bill, was 940 pages. The
Tax Reform Bill, H.R. 10612, enacted by the last Congress, was over 1500
pages. More importantly, arguments about length can be deceptive. The heart
of any new criminal code bill would be found in approximately the first 200
pages of the text, containing the offenses and sentencing provisions. In
addition, approximately another 100 pages would relate to administration and
procedure essentially duplicating current law dealing with such matters as
wiretapping and investigative authority. Thus, the first 300 pages of reform
required in a new bill would be rather modest in length, 46comparable to the
comprehensive criminal codes enacted in various states.
The remaining pages would simply recodify the current FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

and would make non-substantive conforming amend-

45.

See Note 53, infra.

46.

See, e.g., CALIF. PENAL CODE §§ 1-14017 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 101-7505 (1973).

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1976

9

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1976], Art. 3
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

ments in the other 49 titles of the UNrrED STATES CODE. This is necessary to
assure conformity with the content, structure, and terminology of the new
criminal code. The conforming amendments would not create any new
crimes; they would delete obsolete crimes and amend the culpability and
sentencing provisions of the non-Title 18 regulatory offenses. These changes,
although bulky, are beneficial. Rather than relying on numerous different
culpability terms such as "willful", which are not defined and have no
consistent meaning from one section to the next, 7 the conforming amendments would substitute the carefully defined culpability terms noted above.
This would provide clearer standards as to what must be proven to establish an
offense, as well as clear notice of what actually constitutes an offense. These
minor non-Title 18 offenses would also be amended to conform to the
sentencing scheme of a new criminal code.
In addition, the conforming amendments would repeal those offenses in
other titles which would be covered in the new criminal code. For example,
aircraft hijacking offenses currently covered in Title 49 must be repealed,
since they would be included in the new criminal code. Many theft and false
statement offenses, which would be consolidated in the new code, must
similarly be repealed by the conforming amendments.
B.Revision of Title 18
S. 1 carried forward many provisions of Title 18 which I considered
repugnant to the Constitution or which failed to incorporate limiting language
of the United States Supreme Court. Any new bill must not repeat the grave
errors of S. 1, particularly as regards those specific sections discussed below.
1. Impairing Military Effectiveness by False Statements
Section 1114 carries forward a provision of existing law, 18 USC § 2388
(1970), which makes it an offense to make a false statement with intent to
interfere with the operation or success of the military forces of the United
States.
Section 1114 is more narrow than existing law in that it is expressly limited
to purely factual statements. The offense could be further narrowed by
requiring a greater degree of culpability. However, although narrowing the
scope of the offense and requiring greater culpability are obvious improvements, the practical value of this offense is far outweighed by its potentially
chilling effect upon first amendment rights. The only significant cases ever
brought under this offense occurred during World War I and involved
prosecutions for statements of opinion objecting to government war
policies. 48 Virtually all of the statements involved in these prosecutions
47. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 653 (1970) (relating to foreign relations and intercourse); 15 U.S.C.
§ 434 (1970) (relating to commerce and trade).
48. See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920). See also United States v. Pelley,
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would be considered protected speech under current interpretations of the first
amendment. Accordingly, I believe that this type of provision must not be
included in any new bill.
2. Extortion, Blackmail and Labor Strikes
The extortion offense 49 in S. 1 provides:
A person is guilty of an offense if he obtains property of another by
force or by threatening or placing another person in fear that any
person will be subjected to bodily injury or kidnapping or that any
property will be damaged.
Although predicated to apply only to organized crime and other extortion
situations usually involving serious violence or threats of violence such as
arson, murder, maiming or kidnapping, many labor groups were deeply
concerned-legitimately, I believe-that the offense would be construed to
encompass minor violence arising out of labor picketing.
This interpretation, however, appears to be clearly inconsistent with the
Committee Report accompanying S. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the Committee Report) which indicates that the proposed offense was not intended to
cover such conduct. It stated:
In the Committee's view such acts (incidental picket-line violence) do
not fall within the purview of the Hobbs Act (nor should they be
Federally punishable) .... 50
However, this is a matter of such importance that I would recommend that
incidental violence arising in the course of labor picketing be expressly
excluded from any extortion offense in the new bill.
Concern was also expressed that the offense of blackmail, section 1723,
might apply to a union official or union member who threatens to strike. The
blackmail offense proscribes the obtaining of property of another by threatening or placing another person in fear that a person will "improperly subject
another person to economic loss or injury to his business or profession". The
Committee Report stated:
The term 'improperly' is designed to make clear the lack of purpose to
reach legitimate activity, e.g., a strike or picketing, intended to cause
economic loss or injury to a person's business or profession.-"
Again, however, this is a matter of such importance that I would recommend that threats of striking, by a union official or union member, be
expressly excluded from any blackmail offense in the new bill.
132 F.2d 170(7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied318 U.S. 764(1943). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a)(first Para.)
(1970).
49. "A person is guilty of an offense if he obtains property of another by force or by
threatening or placing another person in fear that any person will be subjected to bodily injury or
kidnapping or that any property will be damaged." S. 1, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 1722 (1976).
50. Note 25 supra, at 644.
51. Note 25 supra, at 654.
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3.

Smith Act

S. 1, as introduced, 52 sought to retain the SMITH ACT, 53 making it a crime to
engage in conduct that at some future time would facilitate the forcible
overthrow of the government. That formulation appeared to be contrary to
several Supreme Court decisions which narrowed the applicability of the
SMITH ACT. 54 The Court has sought to draw a distinction between advocacy of
the necessity or propriety of change and the urge to action. The Court has
stated that statutes which fail to draw this distinction impermissibly intrude
upon the first and fourteenth amendments. In Yates, it was held that there
must be a reasonable justification for apprehension that action will occur. In
Brandenberg it was held that freedom of speech and press do not permit a
state to forbid the advocacy of the use of force except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action. Under S. I as originally introduced there was no
requirement of imminency. In fact, the time period in section 1103(1) had
been nebulously expressed as at some future time. (emphasis added) In effect,
this would have broadened the very aspects of the SMITH ACT the Court sought
to narrow in order to protect first and fourteenth amendment rights.
In Whitcomb, the Court made it clear that the Brandenburgreasoning was
still controlling. In Whitcomb, certain officers and voters were denied a place
on Indiana's National Ballot, for the 1972 general election, because of their
failure to file a loyalty oath-as required by an Indiana statute. The statute
prohibited placement on the ballot until affidavits were filed stating that the
group did not advocate the overthrow of local, state or national government.
The Court held the statute unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth
amendments, basing its decision on the fact that the Indiana statute failed to
draw a distinction between advocacy of violent overthrow as an abstract
doctrine and advocacy of unlawful action. The Court stated that failure to
make that distinction would be a return to the "discredited regime of Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)" which was unanimously overruled by
55
Brandenburg.
During the S. 1 negotiations, suggestions were made to narrow the offense
by incorporating the limiting language of the Supreme Court, by limiting the
offense to incitement rather than mere advocacy, and by distinguishing, for
penalty purposes, between leaders of subversive organizations and mere
members of such organizations. However, it did not appear that any formula52. S. 1, 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. § 1101 et. seq. (1976).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970).
54. See Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974); Brandenberg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290(1961); Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951).
55. 414 U.S. at 448.
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tion of the SMIH Ac-r-particularly as it is used as a predicate to investigate
groups which disagree with government policies- could be developed that
would not have had a chilling effect upon first amendment rights. Accordingly, I feel the only effective solution to this important matter is to repeal the
SMITH ACT in any new bill.
4. Demonstrating to Influence a JudicialProceeding
Section 1328 of S. 1 made it an offense to picket or demonstrate near a court
house with intent to influence another person in the discharge of his duties in a
judicial proceeding. The Brown Commission recommended a similar
offense.56 That section carried forward 18 USC § 1507 (1970), but with the
additional safeguard that "near" was replaced by specific language prohibiting such demonstrations only if within "200 feet of a court house". Also, a
prior warning had to first be given before criminal liability could attach. The
Supreme Court upheld a state law based on this federal statute in Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
Nevertheless, I believe a further safeguard must be included in any new bill
which would provide an exception to the statute for dignified, nonviolent
demonstrations on courthouse grounds.
5. Leading a Riot
Concern was raised that the S. I rioting offense (§ 1831) would expand
existing law. Accordingly, S. 1 as reported by the Subcommittee deleted any
federal jurisdiction based on crossing a state line to "plan or promote" a riot,
or based on the use of the mails. Thus, federal jurisdictional requirements
were substantially more narrow than under current law. A new bill should
maintain this position. However, in addition, I believe it is desirable to delete
any federal jurisdiction based on "interference with a government function'". 7 The new bill should also incorporate the Supreme Court test from the

Brandenburg case, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), to require that "incitement" be
advocacy of imminent lawless action under circumstances in which there is a
substantial likelihood that such conduct will occur.58 Finally, there is no
reason why the new code should not also incorporate into the definition of
"riot" the labor exemption contained in current law." With these changes,
any proposed codification would represent a substantial narrowing of the
present offense. Under existing law, anyone who travels in interstate commerce or uses the mail with intent to incite or merely promote a riot, and
performs any act, or attempts to perform any act, for the purpose of inciting or
56. Brown Commission §1325; Working Papers at 623. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW §215, 50(7)
(McKinney 1975).
57. S. 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1831 (1976).
58. 414 U.S. at 447. See United States v. Sweeney, 262 F.2d 272 (3rd Cir. 1959).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (e) (1970).
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promoting a riot, is guilty of an offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970). No riot
need occur; indeed, no actual incitement need occur to constitute the offense.
In contrast, the proposed code should require that the "incitement"
actually cause a riot, should require that the "incitement" involve advocating
"imminent lawless action" as defined by the Supreme Court; 60 and should
require that the definition of "riot" be substantially identical to the proposed
61
definition in the Brown Commission Report.
C.

Proposed New Laws

In addition to carrying forward what I consider dangerous provisions of the
existing Title 18, S. 1 also introduced new laws which demand close scrutiny.
1.

Public Safety Orders

Section 1862 of S. 1 made it an offense if a person refused to obey an order
of a public servant to move, disperse or refrain from activity in a particular
place, where such order was lawful and reasonably designed to protect
persons or property. This offense has been criticized as giving government
officials a license to prevent the right to assemble peaceably. The Committee
Report indicated that the purpose of the offense was not directed to curtailing
the exercise of first amendment rights, but would have been applicable only in
situations such as a riot, flood, fire or similar public disturbance or natural
disaster justifying prompt government action. The requirement that an order
be "lawful and reasonably designed" to protect persons or property would
62
appear to preclude the arbitrary application of this offense.
Nevertheless, there does not appear to be sufficient justification for
creating a general federal offense in this area, with jurisdiction based solely
on the fact that the order was given by a federal public servant or that the
conduct would obstruct a federal government function. Accordingly, I will
urge that a new bill provide general federal jurisdiction only if the order is
given by a federal public servant during the course of a riot, fire, flood or other
disaster.
2.

Solicitation

Section 1003 of S. 1 made it an offense to solicit another person to commit a

crime. Both the MODEL PENAL CODE and the Brown Commission recommended a general solicitation offense. 63 In addition, twenty states have a
60. 395 U.S. at 447.
61. Brown Commission, § 1801; Working Papers, at 1021.
62. See, e.g., Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), upholding a state criminal statute
directed at those refusing to obey a lawful order to disperse.
63. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 5.02, Comment at 82-89 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); Brown
Commission § 1003.
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solicitation offense in their
codes and eight proposed state criminal codes
64
contain such an offense.
Nevertheless, I questioned the applicability of that offense to crimes which
themselves are directed against speech-for example, incitement to riot. A
new bill should expressly prohibit application of the solicitation offense to
such crimes, or to any other crimes that themselves proscribe solicitation (for
example, soliciting a bribe).
3.

Other Essential Changes

Tentative favorable responses from interested Senators have been forthcoming in many other important areas as well-it is anticipated that any new
bill will not include a section prohibiting simple possession of small amounts
of marijuana 65 or the "Official Secrets Act. "66 Important civil liberties
provisions relating to espionage,6 7 disorderly conduct, 6 false statements, 6 9
physical obstruction of a government function 70 and others, must also be
reexamined and either not included in the new bill or modified to make them
constitutionally acceptable.
Some of the other notable anticipated changes are the deletion of almost all
of the statutory defenses and the deletion of any new expansion of capital
punishment. The defenses in S. 1 engendered enormous controversy. Rather71
than debate such sensitive issues as the scope of the public authority defense
and entrapment, 72 it would be wiser to leave these issues for separate debate
and decision. Until the Congress acts on this matter, judicially created
defenses now in effect will remain as they are, subject to case-by-case
development. 7 3 The death penalty provisions were deleted for much the same
reason. Many Senators support codification but oppose capital punishment.
Advocates of the death penalty may support it in separate legislation.
64. See, e.g., Brown Commission, § 1003; MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02; ALA. CODE tit. 14 § 326
(1973); ALASKA STAT. § 11.10.070 (1972); ARK. CODE § 41-705 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
18-2-301 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53a-8 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. REV. tit. II § 501-03
(1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.04 (2) (1976); ILL. STAT. ANN. § 8-1 (1972); LA. STAT. ANN. REV. §
14:28 (1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A § 153 (Special Supp. 1976); MONT.REV. CODE ANN. §
94-4-101 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 100.00 et. seq. (McKinney 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. §
161.435 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 902 (1973); TENN. CODE ANN § 39-115 (1975); TEX. PENAL

CODE § 15.03 (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 7 (1974); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-29 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.30 (1958); and the proposed codes of the
following states; Arizona, Iowa, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, South Carolina
and Tennessee.
65. S. 1, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 1813 (1976).
66. S. 1, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 1121-1126 (1976).
67. S. 1,94th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 1121 (1976).
68. S. 1, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 1334 (1976).
69. S. 1, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 1343 (1976).
70. S. 1, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 1302 (1976).
71.

S. 1, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 541 (1976).

72. S. 1, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 551 (1976).
73. See generally R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW, at 977-1029 (2nd ed. 1969).
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VII.

CONCLUSION

A point has now been reached where effective criminal code reform is
nearing reality after almost twenty years. A new congressional effort will be
made in the 95th Congress; a broad, bipartisan effort reflecting the twin goals
of safeguarding the public welfare while fully preserving individual freedoms. The common goal is the development of a rational, just and respectable
federal criminal code which can assist, not hinder, law enforcement personnel
and members of the judiciary in carrying out their sworn duty to uphold the
law. The federal war on crime requires no less.
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